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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
\

0. A. TANGREN, ETC.,
vs.
ADELINE M. INGALLS
ADELINE M. INGALLS

124252

vs.
A~fERICAN

SAVINGS & LOAN
ASS'N, et al
124797
ADELINE M. INGALLS
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9297

vs.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN ASS'N, et al 124798

PETITION FOR RE-HEARING AND BRIEF OF
RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT THEREOF
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING
Comes now Adeline M. Ingalls, the respondent herein, and respectfully moves this court for a re-hearing in
this case upon the grounds hereinafter set forth.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent relies on no facts other than as set forth
in the Opinion of the court, field November 30, 1961.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES TO A JOINT TENANCY
AGREEMENT IS IN GREATER JEOPARDY UNDER THE
RULE OF 'THE MAJORITY OPINION THAN IF THE RULE
OF LONG STANDING WERE APPLIED.
POINT II
THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY OPINION HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES TO A JOINT TENANCY
AGREEMENT IS IN GREATER JEOPARDY UNDER THE
RULE OF THE MAJORITY OPINION THAN IF THE RULE
OF-LONG STANDING WERE APPLIED.

Unfortunately, an infallible method of determining
intent has not been folmd. The majority opinion holds
that the rebuttable rule is more desirable than the conclusive rule. With this we respectfully disagree and earnestly contend the opposite to be true.
The argument of the majority opinion in support
of the rebuttable rule· is three-fold: 1. Unlikelihood of
contest if the agreen1ent states the true intent. 2. High
quality of evidenc.e required to overcome the presumption. 3. Protection of the ''Dead Man Statute.'' The
fallacy of such argument is tha.t the dead man statute
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is more likely to defeat the intention of the parties than
to protect it, for the statute precludes the "other party"
to the agreement, as in the instant case, from testifying
to matters equally within her knowledge and that of the
deceased. Thus, the court is deprived of the testimony
of the person who is Inost likely to know of the intent o.f
the parties.
The quality of proof required to overcome the presumption is characterized by the majority op·inion as a
"defensive shield" but the "shield'' loses much of its
defensive character without the testimony of the "other
party" to the agreement. Evidence produced to rebut the
preswnption might be considered sufficient in the absence
of the testimony of the "other p·arty,'' but ins.ufficient
when considered with evidence of the "other party," were
he not prohibited from testifying by the dead man statute.
~

The n1ajority states that if the intent 'vas in fact to
create a joint tenancy, a contest thereof would be rare.
Obviously, such is not true under the rebuttable rule,
for the rebuttable rule is tantamount to an open invitation for designing persons to contest the agreement.
The conclusive rule is criticized by the majority on
the ground that it presupposes the intent of the deceased
and in some instances may not give effect to true intent.
In answer to this we submit that rather than to hazard
defeat of the true intent of the deceased by reason of the
inherent difficulties of the rebuttable rule, the court
should be confined to the agreement itself to determine
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intent. In order to correct the r"<are. instance. in which the
joint tenancy agreement may not express true intent, the
majority has set up a rule which by reason of its infirmities endangers the true intent of all such agreements.
Justice is achieved under the conclusive rule, for in most
cases the true intent of the parties will be carried out,
and even the rare exception finds legal justification for
it gives effect to the express intent. Evaluation of the
two rules emphasizes the wisdom of retaining the conclusive rule which has been the law of this jurisdiction for
many years.
POINT II
THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY OPINIO·N HAS NO
APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR.

The rule of the case, as stated by the majority, is as
follows:
. . . where there is a written agreement of
joint tenancy with right of surVivorship, there is
a presumption of validity and it will be given effect unless it is successfully attacked for fraud,
mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity, or unless
it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that
the parties intended otherwise; and further, that
such rule is applicable whether the parties are
living or where death has intervened.
If the majority of the court is determined to discard
a rule of long standing, and, in its stead adopt the one
quoted above with its attendant infirmities, such has no
application to the case at bar and does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. The rule itself, indeed the entire
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opinion of the majority, emphasizes the intention of the
parties. On Page 5 of the Opinion allegations of the complaint are quoted, follo"\\ring which is the statement, "The
foregoing allegations appear to be sufficie~t to provide
a foundation to receive evidence a.s to what the intent of
the parties was and their relationship to the fund at
the tilne of the creation of the account." (Emphasis ours.)
The complaint is barren of allegations of intent of .the
parties. Allegations of intent therein are of one of the
parties only. Allegations of ownership~ of the account,
lack of contribution thereto by survivor, lack of any indebtedness owing by deceased to survivor, and subs.equent
gift of a portion of the fund by deceased to survivor· are
not allegations of intent. Although reeognized to be in
disrepute by the majority, Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39
Pac. 2d 715, contains a statement as follows: "We do not
regard the questions of original ownership of the money
as controlling under the particular facts of this case.''
Appellant was afforded op·portunity to amend in
the lower court, but he elected to stand on the complaint
as filed. Had facts other than those alleged existed, appellant would undoubtedly have amended the comp·laint.
4\lthough the right of a litigant to offer proof should be
safeguarded, where a pleading is wholly lacking in allegation of fact, which if proved would entitle him to relief
under the law, there is no injustice in granting s1unmary
judgment. Such is the case at bar.
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CONCLUSION
The majority rule places the intent of the parties in
jeopardy, invites litigation, tends to promote injustice,
and has no application to the case at bar. We respectfully urge the court to re-affirm the rule of long standing in this State, or if the rule of the majority is retained,
to detennine it inapplicable to the case at bar and to
affirm the judgment of the tri.al CO"D:~t.
Respectfully submitted,
..

HAROLD R. BOYER
RO!INEY, BOYER AND RONNOW
·Attorneys for Respondent
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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